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
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1 5 NOV 1966

HEADQUARTERS, 6TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TRUCK)
APO 96491


AVC A-SGN-AB-A-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS-CSFOR-65)

TO:

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development Department of The Army (ACSFOR, DA) Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION 1. Significant Organizational Activities



FILE COF

1. The main body of the 6th Transportation Battalion (Trk) departed from Tacoma, Washington aboard the USNS Pope on 23 July 1966. The advance party consisted of the Battalion Commander, the S-3, and the S-4, and departed from Travis Air Force Base on 3 August 1966.

a. The primary problem faced in preparing the unit for movement overseas was a personnel problem. Although the 6th Transportation Battalion has been in existence for a number of years, the great majority of the personnel who deployed with the headquarters did not join the organization until 1 June 1966. Though individually well trained and qualified, there was little time available for devotion to the development of the internal organization of the headquarters.

b. In order to make maximum use of the time available, the battalion moved to Camp Pickett, Virginia for a period of field training on 3 June 1966. This five day exercise served as the real "shakedown" period for the personnel of the organization.

2. The advance party arrived at Tan Son Nhut Airbase on 4 August 1966 and moved immediately to its new station in Long Binh. The main body arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on 12 August 1966 and arrived at Long Binh on 13 August 1966. Red circle TAT equipment arrived on 15 August 1966, and the battalion was given its initial operational missions on 18 August 1966.

a. The only military unit placed under the command and control of the battalion on that date was the 120th Transportation Company (Lt-Trk). This unit has two platoons stationed at Long Binh, and one platoon on TDY at Vung Tau. The platoon at Vung Tau is considered a separate unit, and is not under the command and control of this organization.

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ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT

(ARMY) ATTN: FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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- b. The battalion was also given the mission of administration and control of the office of the Contracting Officer's Representative for a contract with Equipment, Incorporated, a subsidiary of Sea Land Service, Incorporated. This firm operates a fleet of 440 commercial design trucks which are used primarily to move cargo from the port of Saigon.
- 3. Initial efforts of the battalion were directed towards improving the operational performance of the one military unit attached and becoming familiar with the operating practices of the contractor.
- a. The 120th Transportation Company was the first US Army truck company to arrive in Vietnam, and its equipment and personnel had been pushed to the maximum for some menths. In addition, the unit had deployed with many trucks which were in excess of eight years old. The combination of old equipment and emphasis on maximum operation had resulted in a very low vehicle availability rate. This rate has been reversed by two actions:
- (1) A resumption of interest and command emphasis on first and second echelon maintenance and the provision of adequate time for maintenance.
- (2) A continued effort has been made to turn in worn out vehicles and secure replacements.
- b. Problems encountered in the office of The Contracting Officer's Representative are more complex. At the request of the Government, the Contractor initiated operations before being fully prepared, and overall performance has rarely been more than marginally satisfactory. An early start, however, is not the only factor contributing to this low performance level.
- (1) The contractor has never been able to establish good relations with his local national employees. This has resulted in several strikes and labor interruptions.
- (2) The level of driver performance and supervision is low. The contractor has not yet been able to establish a satisfactory degree of control over his driver force.
- (3) There is no really effective inspection and maintenance program in effect at the present time. The vehicles have aged rapidly and the number of roadside breakdowns is increasing.
- c. The task of increasing contractor performance is a challenging one that requires skill, patience, and tact. Deficiencies have

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Tossons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS-CSFOR-65)

been brought to the attention of the contractor in writing, whenever noted. The Contracting Officer has been kept fully informed concerning the status of contractor performance. Daily contact is maintained with the contractor, and some improvements have been made. The overall level of performance, however, still leaves much to be desired.

- 4. On 13 September 1966, a Viet Cong force of undetermined size blasted a hole in the fence of the Contractor's motor pool near Thu Duc, entered the area, and destroyed or damaged beyond repair 37 vehicles. The administration building was also severely damaged. During the attack, a total of 5 Vietnamese personnel were killed. One Australian supervisor was found to be missing following the attack and is presumed to have been captured.
- a. The contractor moved dispatch operations to a temporary site in Saigon Port and continued to operate, although tonnage carried was well below normal for some time.

- b. On 15 September 1966, the 86th Transportation Company (Lt Trk) was placed on TDY with this battalion to provide back up driver support for Equipment, Inc. The equipment for the 86th had been delayed in reaching the theater, and the unit's driver personnel were available for this mission.
- c. On 17 September 1966, the contractor was able to return operations to the Thu Duc site. During the hours of darkness, a US military security force under the staff supervision of the 6th Transportation Battalion is now responsible for local security of the Thu Duc meter pool.
- d. Members of the 86th Transportation Company were used to supplement the local national driver force for the remainder of the month. They were gradually withdrawn from this role as the contractor's operation returned to normal.
- e. A Viet Cong force, with supporting mortar and automatic weapons fire, attempted to again enter the motor pool on 10 October 1966. With the aid of pre-planned support from armed helicopters, the attack was beaten off and four VC dead were confirmed by body count. Four US personnel were wounded, and there was no damage to vehicles or the installation.
- 5. During the first 45 days of operation, the battalion headquarters was handicapped to some extent by the absence of its vehicles and other items of TOE equipment shipped as Category Z carge. The ship carrying this equipment was delayed for repairs enroute, and only TAT equipment was available for use during this period. Minimum administra-

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tive vehicle support was made available from a Transportation Motor Pool, and this limitation did not severely restrict the activities of the battalion staff. Fortunately, the items selected for shipment as TAT equipment were sufficient to sustain operations during this period.

- 6. In late September, a decision was made to retain the 86th Transportation Company at Long Binh and place it under the command of the 6th Transportation Battalion. This unit became fully operational on 17 October 1966. Three additional units arrived from CONUS and were attached to this battalion during October. They are the 87th, 261st, and 543rd Transportation Companies. All are light truck companies. The 261st, however, is equipped with 5 ton cargo trucks. These three units are scheduled to become operational in early November.
- 7. During this first quarter of operations in Vietnam, the units of this battalion were used primarily in two roles port clearance and convoy operations.
- a. Port clearance operations were characterized by infiltration movements over relatively secure routes in the Saigon, Long Binh, Bien Hoa area. These operations are conducted 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
- b. The majority of the convoy operations were resupply missions from the Saigon Long Binh area to base camps of combat units. These convoys are usually loaded at night and travel during daylight hours only. Armed military police escort is provided, and this is supplemented with armored personnel carriers and helicopter gunships as required.

Section 2. Part I. Observations (Lessons Learned)

a. Personnel:

Assignment of Non-deployable Personnel

Item: Disposition of Personnel Retained in CONUS upon Movement of Parent Unit Overseas.

<u>Discussion</u>: Some of the new units attached to this organization deployed from CONUS at full morning report strength, yet without all personnel assigned. The 543rd Transportation Company (Lt Trk) is a case in point. When this unit left Fort Campbell, Kentucky, eight enlisted men were left behind and attached to other units. Two were awaiting completion of action on requests for compassionate reassignment. Three had other members of their immediate family already in Vietnam. One was in the hospital, and two were deferred for completion of other personnel actions. Therefore, in terms of effective strength, this unit is short eight personnel and has no basis at present for obtaining replacements.

Observation: When a unit departs a CONUS station for duty overseas, personnel who can not accompany the unit should be reassigned to other CONUS units so that the moving unit will have a valid basis for obtaining replacements.

b. Operations:

Communications

Item: Communications During Convoy Operations

<u>Discussion</u>: Units of this organization are continously engaged in convoy operations which are escorted by ground combat units and aircraft. These escort units are equipped with the new AN/VRC-12 series radios. These sets have a much larger frequency spectrum than the older AN/VRC-10 series radios which some truck companies in this area still utilize. The armed escort vehicles and supporting aircraft frequently use a frequency which is not compatible with these older sets. This severly limits truck unit platoon leaders in their efforts to coordinate closely with escort vehicles and aircraft.

 $\underline{\text{Observation:}}$ All truck companies should be equipped with the AN/VRC-12 series radios.

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Consignor/Consignee Capabilities

Item: The ability of consignors and consignees to ship and receive cargo.

Discussion: There is a great deal of interest and command emphasis directed toward increasing the flow of tonnage and relieving congested conditions in the port of Saigon. Most of this attention has been directed at increasing the port's capability to load and ship, particularly by truck. The biggest port clearance bottleneck, however, is the inability of consignees in this area to unload and receive the quantities of cargo shipped to them on a regular basis. This lack of reception capability results in backlogs of loaded vehicles at consignees and a lack of empty vehicles available for loading in the port. Members of the port state that more trucks are needed, yet those made available for port clearance operations average slightly over one trip per vehicle per shift. Given the relatively short distances involved, trucks should average at least two trips per shift.

Observation: Logisticians should place emphasis on increasing the cargo reception capability of depots to a point where it matches the port's capability to ship cargo.

- c. Training and Organization: None
- d. Intelligence: None
- e. Logistics: None
- f. Other: None

Section 2, Part II, kecommendations

a. Personnel: That CONUS installations be directed to reassign personnel who can not deploy with a unit. This organization has initiated direct correspondence with CONUS installations to secure reassignment of personnel still assigned to units in this battalion.

b. Operations:

- (1) That all truck companies in Vietnam be equipped with radios in the AN/VRC-12 series. Two units within this battallon are equipped with the old series radios. New sets are or requisition, and issue is expected within 60 days.
- (2) That immediate action be taken to increase the wargo reception capability of depots and storage locations in the Saigon-Long Binh area. This need has been pointed out in briefings and in staff visits conducted by personnel of this headquarters to higher and adjacent units.
 - c. Training and Organization: None
 - d. Intelligence: None
 - e. Logistics: None
 - f. Other: None

ROBERT W. METCALFE

Maj, TO

Commanding

AVCA-SGN-AB-CO (15 Nov 66) lst Ind SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS-CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 48TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MT), APO 96491 17 November 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Stoff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

- 1. The report of the 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) has been reviewed and is considered to be an adequate and impartial report of the unit's activities during the quarter ending 31 October 1966.
- 2. The problem of personnel shortage and replacements is constantly supervised by this headquarters. Higher headquarters has been kept constantly apprised of the personnel situation both in writing and by personal liaison.
- 3. New series radios are on request for all units not already equipped with them. Aggressive followsp action by the Group Communications Officer has been accomplished frequently in an attempt to expedite receipt of the new series radios.
- U. The problem of consignee cargo reception ability has been brought to the attention of higher headquarters in numerous reports and letters. Waiting time to be unloaded has been documented and submitted. This problem is receiving aggressive attention by all concerned.

Tel: Long Binh 676

Commanding

Colonel

AVCA SGN-GO (15 Nov 66) 2nd Ind SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966 (6th Trans Co)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON, APO San Francisco 96307

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96307
Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army (ACSTOR, DA) Washington D.C. 20310

- 1. Forwarded in accordance with paragraph 9, AR 1-19, dated May 1966.
- 2. Reference paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement, new series radios are currently being installed.

TEL: Tiger 875

GILBERT P. LEVY Colonel, OrdC Commanding AVCA GO-O (15 Nov 66)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307

1 0 DEC 1966

To: Deputy Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVEGC-DH, APO 96307

- 1. The Operational Report Jessons Learned submitted by the 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for the quarter ending 31 October 1966 is forwarded herewith.
- 2. Reference paragraph 3, Section I, Page 2. CODs are now being appointed concurrently with award of contract, which enables the Government and contractor to achieve the necessary understanding to operate the contracts successfully. The contractor is now engaged in a labor relations program which should improve relations with the employees. The contractor is now hiring more supervisors. The Director of Maintenance is conducting a technical inspection of the US Government owned vehicles. This will enable the contractor to begin an intensive maintenance program. Continuous effort by the contracting officer and the COR should increase the overall level of performance in operations, maintenance, safety, and labor relations.
- 3. Reference paragraph b, Section II, Part I, last item. At present, Saigon Port publishes and updates, on a recurring basis, a list of all consigners as pertains to their receiving capability. This list has proved an important tool in the distribution of transport effort and assists in improving truck turn-around time and port clearance. Receiving capability, however, has been scriously hampered by a shortage of material handling equipment. A comprehensive study pertaining to present FHE distribution configuration and deadline rate is being staffed by the Director of Supply.
- 4. The 6th Transportation Battalion was engaged in 12 days of troop movement, 5 days of administrative organization and 75 days of combat support operations during the reporting period.
- 5. Concur with the basic report as modified by the comments contained in the preceding indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GLENN A. DOYLE

Sandling Bring, Get

Cupi, AGC

Cupt, AG

TEL: Lynx 782/930

AVHCC-DH (15 Nov 66) 4th Ind SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 23 DEC '66

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT APO 96558

- 1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) as indersed.
- 2. Concur with the basic report as modified by the previous indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. R. AUTREY

Cpt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

Lalrey

GFOF-OT(15 Nov 66)

SURJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 11 JAN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. L. McMULLIN OPT, AGC Asst AG

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